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INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
Arguments about the proper role of the federal government 
have been a staple of American political life. That topic was at the 
core of the debate over ratification of the Constitution, and it re-
mains a central issue in contemporary politics.' Although the argu-
ments typically have a strong pragmatic aspect (e.g., whether pub-
lic policy is made more effectively at the state or local level than 
at the national level), much of the debate explicitly invokes con-
stitutional values. This is neither surprising nor inappropriate, be-
cause the Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is."2 It 
also provides the framework for our government and our politics. 
In light of our "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,"3 we should expect our fundamental charter to figure in 
public discourse. The Constitution, after all, is an important part of 
our culture as well as of our law.4 
At the same time, the proper role of the national government 
has become the subject of litigation. That, too, should come as no 
surprise to anyone familiar with Tocqueville's famous observation 
that "[s)carcely any political question arises in the United States 
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."5 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
I. Indeed, the key phrase in the title of this symposium, "The New Federalism," is a 
hardy perennial. Proposals to limit the scope of the national government have gone under 
that title for at least a quarter-century. See TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1988); DAVID R. MAYHEW, DI-
VIDED WE GOVERN 90, 98 (1991). 
2. ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139 (1908), quoted in LOUIS 
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 245 (1988). 
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
4. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MAC!llNE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 381-400 (1986); 
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-33 (1988). 
5. ALEXlS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., 1945). I was going to say that every schoolchild has heard some 
variation of this statement, but Professor Frickey persuaded me not to. See Philip P. 
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and 
635 
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A substantial proportion of the legal debate concerning federal 
power has involved the Commerce Clause. Much of that debate 
can be traced to Gibbons v. Ogden,6 the foundational case inter-
preting that provision. Chief Justice Marshall characterized congres-
sional power in this field as "plenary"7 and, in the same para-
graph, suggested that the judiciary had no role in constraining 
federal authority.8 But a few pages later, Marshall conceded that 
the states might have some power to regulate articles of commerce 
before they became part of interstate or foreign comrnerce.9 The 
Court struggled with the tensions implicit in Gibbons for more than 
a century before the New Deal transformation ushered in a doctrin-
al structure suggesting that there were no judicially enforceable 
limits on the commerce power. 
Against this background, the decision last spring in United 
States v. Lopez/0 which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990,1 1 came as a distinct surprise. The last case in which 
the Court had struck down a federal statute under the Commerce 
Clause was Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,12 decided in 1936 at the 
height of the constitutional conflict over the New Deal. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist' s majority opinion sought to harmonize the ruling 
with six decades of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Both he and concurring Justice Kennedy noted several deficiencies 
in the Gun-Free School Zones Act, including the absence of a 
jurisdictional element linking the possession of a firearm within 
1 ,000 feet of a school to interstate commerce, the omission of 
congressional findings justifying federal regulation, and the primacy 
of state authority over both education and street crime. Neverthe-
less, Lopez was widely viewed as a major development portending 
significant change in constitutional doctrine. 13 Justice Thomas's 
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 696 n.IO (1996). 
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
7. ld. at 197. 
8. "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and 
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . . the sole restraints on 
which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse." !d. 
9. ld. at 203 (discussing state inspection laws, which "act upon the subject before it 
becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it 
for that purpose"). 
10. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
11. Crime Control Act of 1990, § 1702, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)). 
12. 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936). 
13. For a summary of the commentary to this effect, by both supporters and critics of 
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concurrence, calling for a return to the original understanding of a 
much more limited commerce power, also implied the potential 
significance of the case. 
The notion that we might be seeing a resurgence of judicially 
imposed limits on "big government" drew some support from the 
Court's recent Tenth Amendment decisions. Although that provision 
was dismissed as a mere "truism" more than fifty years before 
Lopez in United States v. Darby, 14 it seemed to take on new life 
in National League of Cities v. Usery. 15 Despite the demise of 
National League of Cities a few years later in Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority,16 the impassioned dissents in 
that case, and the recent decisions in Gregory v. Ashcroft17 and 
New York v. United States, 18 suggest the continuing allure of 
Court-policed federalism doctrines. 
To explore the meaning and implications of Lopez, the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review assembled more than a dozen distin-
guished legal scholars at a symposium held November 10 and 11, 
1995. This issue contains the major papers and many of the com-
mentaries delivered there, as well as a student Comment addressing 
one of the many federal statutes whose validity has been called 
into question by the Lopez decision. 
Robert F. Nagel, author of the first principal paper, expresses 
skepticism that Lopez signals a major transformation in constitu-
tional doctrine. Professor Nagel says that the Court failed to apply 
its announced substantial-effects test and that this failure has ex-
pansive rather than restrictive implications for federal power. Rath-
er than criticize the Court's apparent waffling, he suggests five 
possible judicial responses to the interpretive problem presented by 
a Constitution that purports to delegate only enumerated powers to 
the federal government but includes some powers that are potential-
ly infinite if taken at all seriously. The actual results of recent 
the idea, see Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 643, 
643 (1996). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to Subject States to 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at A1 (suggesting that Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (limiting congressional authority to abrogate states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity) reflects continuation of the Court's rethinking of federalism 
that began in Lopez). 
14. 312 u.s. 100, 124 (1941). 
15. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
16. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
17. 501 u.s. 452 (1991). 
18. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
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decisions in a variety of areas imply that even the Court's conser-
vatives, despite some rhetorical bows in the direction of decentral-
ization, are not as committed to a radical reduction in federal au-
thority as many observers believe. 
Commentaries by Jesse H. Choper, Melvyn R. Durchslag, and 
Deborah Jones Merritt explore Lopez from a variety of perspec-
tives. Dean Choper finds vindication for his skepticism that the 
judiciary can effectively police federalism disputes, while Professors 
Durchslag and Merritt offer differing analyses of the possibilities 
for more substantial doctrinal change. 
The symposium turned next to the question of congressional 
fmdings. Philip P. Frickey points out that the absence of such 
findings was much more significant to the Fifth Circuit than to the 
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist' s opinion contains only 
three sentences on the subject, and those say only that findings are 
helpful but not mandatory. That is consistent with the Court's 
general approach to the matter, in cases arising both before and 
since the New Deal. 
Cautioning against the prospect that legislative findings might 
degenerate to the level of boilerplate, Professor Frickey neverthe-
less sees three uses for findings suggested by Lopez. First, Con-
gress might use findings to buttress the case for federal action by 
articulating the applicable judicial standard and then demonstrating 
how that standard has been satisfied through citation of facts gath-
ered in legislative hearings or other investigations. Second, congres-
sional findings might be used to satisfy "plain statement" rules 
articulated by the Supreme Court in cases involving the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments. These findings would demonstrate a clear 
legislative intent to regulate core state functions; their absence 
would justify a narrow interpretation of a statute, not invalidation. 
Third, findings might be a useful way to curb legislative excesses 
relating to certain noneconomic regulations that have traditionally 
been subject to rationality review. 
The discussion, exemplified by the comments of Barry Fried-
man and Harold J. Krent, explored the value of findings for pro-
tecting the interests of state and local governments, and compared 
the more stringent requirement of findings by administrative agen-
cies whose decisions are subject to judicial review. 
Kathleen F. Brickey, author of the third principal paper, fo-
cused on a special feature of the Gun-Free School Zones Act: it 
created a federal crime for conduct that was simultaneously an 
offense under state law. Congress has federalized numerous state 
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crimes. This trend seems to have accelerated in recent years, to the 
dismay of the Judicial Conference of the United States and many 
observers of the federal courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has never invalidated such a statute and did not purport to do so in 
Lopez, although Professor Brickey notes that judicial uneasiness 
was not hard to discern in some of the opinions. She explores the 
relationship between federal and state law in the case but, like 
many other observers, cannot explain why the state authorities 
dropped charges against Alphonso Lopez or why the federal prose-
cutor was so eager to pursue the case. Finally, she sees the Court's 
refusal, in the wake of Lopez, to overturn rulings in several cases 
raising Commerce Clause challenges to other federal criminal stat-
utes as evidence that the decision is intended primarily as a cau-
tionary message to Congress. 
Much of the discussion following Professor Brickey's presen-
tation focused on precisely how the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
might be amended to cure the defects the Court identified. Partici-
pants also explored in considerable detail other federal criminal 
statutes that are likely to be challenged on Lopez grounds, which 
led to consideration of possible constitutional limits on federalizing 
crimes that have traditionally been handled at the state level and 
on the rationales for creating new federal offenses. 
The symposium concluded with an extended meditation by 
Mark Tushnet on the potential ramifications of Lopez. Professor 
Tushnet takes his inspiration from Bruce Ackerman's distinction 
between ordinary politics and episodes of extraordinary popular 
attention to fundamental issues of political theory and organization. 
He asks whether Lopez might represent part of the beginning of 
what Ackerman calls a constitutional moment.19 Conceding that 
the decision (even when considered in conjunction with contempo-
raneous political events) does not rise to that level, Tushnet none-
theless finds that Lopez could have much more sweeping conse-
quences than others predict. In particular, read in tandem with 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peffa/0 the decision goes to the 
heart of the governmental transformation effected by the Recon-
struction Amendments. He suggests that the Court is actually less 
concerned with the scope of the federal government than with its 
structure, especially the pathologies produced by interest-group 
19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
20. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
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politics. The Court, from this perspective, finds such pathologies in 
affirmative action programs that impose burdens on working-class 
whites and in symbolic legislation like the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act that simultaneously duplicates state laws and has little real 
impact on school violence. Noting that Lopez was argued on the 
day that Republicans won control of both houses of Congress for 
the first time in forty years/1 Tushnet also sees the possibility of 
an evaporation rather than a devolution of governmental authority. 
In this, but perhaps not in much else, he agrees with Professor 
Nagel that the current popular mood may be less one of support 
for state and local governments than of hostility toward public au-
thority at all levels. 
This paper provoked wide-ranging discussion, as the comments 
by Larry Kramer and Suzanna Sherry indicate. The conversation 
focused on theoretical issues raised by Ackerman's thesis and 
Tushnet's analysis of the meaning of the New Deal transformation, 
as well as on the larger significance of the Lopez decision. Con-
cerns were also raised about the implications for the future of 
democratic politics in a society in which transnational private inter-
ests have the ability to avoid meaningful regulation or control by 
any level of government. 
This Law Review issue concludes with a Comment by Rebecca 
Wistner, one of the Review's contributing editors. Her Comment 
addresses the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act 
of 199222 in light of Lopez. This statute imposes criminal sanc-
tions for willfully failing to pay child support when the child lives 
in another state. Several district courts have considered this issue 
and reached contradictory conclusions. Ms. Wistner analyzes the 
arguments as well as the policies underlying the statute, concluding 
that the Act passes constitutional muster but represents questionable 
use of federal resources. 
Finally, a word about one aspect of the symposium that is not 
published here. To bring a more practical perspective to the delib-
erations, we asked U.S. Representative Thomas Sawyer to speak at 
dinner on the program's first evening. Representative Sawyer has 
no legal training but does participate in an informal House working 
group on the Constitution. Of greater significance for present pur-
21. In making this observation, Professor Tushnet does not suggest that "th' supreme 
court follows th' illiction returns." The Supreme Court's Decisions, in THE WORLD OF 
MR. DOOLEY 86, 89 (Louis Filler ed., 1962). 
22. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). 
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poses, his unusual background gives him a unique perspective on 
the issues raised by Lopez and the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 
Now in his tenth year as a member of Congress, he previously 
served as mayor of Akron, Ohio, and in the Ohio General Assem-
bly. Before seeking elective office, he was a secondary school 
English teacher in Cleveland. One of his most memorable teaching 
experiences was taking a loaded gun from one of his students 
during class. 
In short, the Case Western Reserve Law Review sought to put 
together a comprehensive program addressing the major aspects of 
Lopez. The two days of formal and informal discussion were re-
markably stimulating for all the participants. If the published pa-
pers bring some of that excitement to a larger audience, the Review 
will count the project as an even larger success. 
